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CONFLICTS ON EXPORT CONTROLS AND DEFENSE
TRADE MATTERS
Terence Murphy* & DouglasForsythe~

It is a dispute with the United States that has been going on for at least a
year. As a matter of fact, it pre-dates that. All of us involved in it had really
thought we would have a deal; we would have a package that we could
discuss. We are still not there. We are getting there. So I hope you will bear
with me and allow a certain amount of caution in some of my remarks simply
because we just do not yet have a deal. But I will try to take you as far along
as I can.
For a bit of historical context, if I may; much of the Canadian-U.S.
relationships on export controls arise out of the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement.
That agreement arose out of a meeting between President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister MacKenzie King which led through the war and then the
post-war period to increasing integration of the defense industrial base in
North America. Part of the regime seen through those treaties and defense
arrangements and MOU's and exchanges of notes led to Canadian industry
becoming integrated into the U.S. defense industry and vice versa. It allowed
for us to adopt the common security approach to North America. It
manifested itself in our defense relationship with NORAD,' and on the
export control side, a fairly free movement of goods whereby a lot of U.S.
defense items moved into Canada, and Canadian defense moved into the
United States without export controls. This was of a great advantage,
certainly, to our defense industries, and a great advantage to the American
military in terms of procurement.
Things have changed in the world in terms of security. Security concerns
have changed. The concerns have changed very much, certainly driven by
American concerns, but we also share many of those concerns. One of the
great problems with the ITARs is the distance between where we agree in
principle, but somehow on the details, we just cannot seem to make it work.
The biggest change came in dealing with changes to the Canadian
exemption, both in the commerce regime of controls and the State
Department regime. There are Canadian exemptions. Some of this comes out
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of some changes to the ITARs driven by non-Canadian events, if you will.
One of which was coming out of the Cox Commission, its report on various
problems in terms of controls, particularly on satellite technology. Congress
decided that the State Department should assume responsibility for satellites.
All satellites, even commercial satellites, became defined as military
satellites just by sort of regulatory and statutory change, which resulted in
decision flows and amendments being made into the ITAR.
Then there was a convention which required additional controls that had
not been placed on Canadian and U.S. goods, but which we agreed to
because we were both parties to that. So that led to amendments to the ITAR
coming about almost a year ago today. They were published on April 12th,
1999, with changes to the Canadian exemption. But the Canadian exemption
was changed in ways that went beyond those necessitated by firearms
controls and by the movement of satellites onto the State Department's
control. The scope of the exemption was narrowed. Canadian industry found
itself, where it had been able to have access to U.S. goods through the use of
the exemption, being denied that. Most critically, this is partly due to some
regulatory change and partly due to a State Department re-interpretation of
what the previous agreement meant; technical data was no longer being
covered. So where goods may flow, the technical data could not, which
practically meant that Canadian companies were in a position where they
could not bid on projects.
This is particularly critical in Canadian industry who tend not to be
manufacturing the big products, but tend to be bidding as sub-component
suppliers with fairly short turnarounds. These bidders are looking for
responses, say, within ninety days. They could not even send the bid package
out to a Canadian company because they now needed State Department
clearance. They were not going to get the clearance within the ninety days
anyway. So those kinds of practical problems were having quite an impact on
Canadian industry. There also was, and this is probably the most troublesome
aspect, another re-interpretation by the State Department legal advisors that
U.S. companies had really misunderstood who was a Canadian citizen.
The Canadian exemption basically read, since the early 1990s, that these
goods could flow into Canada if they are intended for use in Canada by a
Canadian citizen. When you talk about Canadian citizens, it means Canadian
workers in plants. It was decided that, if that person in Canada happened to
be a Canadian citizen and a citizen of another country, then the Canadian
exemption did not apply. They had to be looked at in terms of their other
citizenship. Canada does not require the renunciation of another citizenship;
we have not required that for twenty-five years. We have a high number of
immigrants in Canada. There probably is not a major industry in Canada that
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does not have many dual citizens. Fifty percent of the population in
metropolitan Toronto was foreign-born, most of whom would bear dual
citizenship.
This really gutted, in effect, the Canadian exemption and has created
tremendous difficulties for us. It has been a matter of very high level
attention since it occurred. It was a matter for fairly constant discussions at
the administrative level since even before the publication of the changes one
year ago. Within ten days of the changes being published, there was a joint
statement arising out of a meeting between Minister Lloyd Axworthy and
Secretary of State Madeline Albright where it was agreed that we would
work together on trying to restore the balance in the relationship, to mitigate
the effects on Canadian industry, but at the same time, preserve what we all
recognized were some serious security concerns for the United States and the
need on the Canadian part to address some of these concerns.
Despite this focus on moving forward and quickly working out the
details, as is always the case in these situations, it has proved very, very
difficult. We labored in meetings taking place at fairly high levels through
the spring and summer. A lot of progress was made, but some very serious
meddlesome issues continued, particularly on the dual citizen issue.
In October of 1999, President Clinton made a trip to Ottawa. There was
really a focused attempt on the part of officials to get this issue out of the
way. They wanted to use the attention that it was getting from very senior
levels on both sides of the border, particularly for Canada which was finally
getting more consistent senior level attention to resolving this dispute. At the
time of the President's visit, there was a joint statement issued by Minister
Axworthy and Secretary Albright that re-affirmed a lot of what was really
critical. There was a joint commitment to control the sensitive technology
that was under concern whose very nature was far from being just big, heavy,
clunky machinery that customs inspectors could spot.
Many of the concerns were geared toward technical data, as I alluded to,
information that could be easily stored in different mediums. It presented a
different scale of problems. You did not have nice, neat agreed-upon enemies
where the COCOM could sit down together and say, here is the Warsaw Pact
over here. We understand who the players are, and how these things are
being controlled. It was just a different environment.
There was more of a need to recognize, particularly on the Canadian side,
that we had to adapt more. We committed ourselves to regulatory changes
that would bring our system more in line with yours. It was quite rightly
pointed out that, because of gaps in the system that allowed U.S. goods to
flow into Canada without controls on exports on our general undertaking,
that we would not allow re-export to areas that would be of concern to the
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United States. In fact, some of those goods were not controlled by us as an
export matter. There were some gaps that needed to be filled. In return for
that, the idea would be that there would be a restoration of some form of
Canadian exemption that worked. On the issue of citizenship, what you are
really talking about is a security issue. We were not prepared to treat a
person as a security risk on the basis of nationality, per se. That is just not on
legally. It is not on politically. It just is not really acceptable. Certainly at the
very high level, that was understood. The goal of the United States was
enhanced security. But, in terms of working out the details of this, it has
proved very difficult.
But we have been making progress. We have met a number of times. We
are close to saying that there will be a structure in place, which will address
the concerns on the American side. They will address concerns that, in
working through this process, we have identified weaknesses in our own
system that we would have had to fix anyway. We will take on a regulatory
burden, it would seem, and impose some costs in our industry to address U.S.
security concerns in ways, perhaps, we would not have done if we would
have been on our own.
It basically relates to the citizenship issue. As I said, we were not
prepared to go as far as to say that persons of a particular nationality, per se,
are a problem. But we do recognize that there is a need to have a capacity to
track sensitive technologies that are exported to the United States that are in
Canada. They are being used in our defense industries primarily for re-export
into the United States. We needed to know, where are these technologies?
Where are these goods? Who has access to them? Is it secure? So, as the
resolution of this dispute is shaping up, it will probably result in a form of
registration for Canadian users of these types of sensitive U.S. technologies.
The model we are looking at is an expansion of two security programs, the
Industrial Security Program, which deals with classified material, and the
Joint Certification Program, which is a Canada-U.S. program which allows
certain other technologies to go to registered users.
The model we will probably use would have these goods going within
Canada to registered users. These big companies would be valued in some
way for security, and they would take on the responsibility of the secure
handling of the goods and technologies and being accountable for them. In
many cases, these companies do that anyway for their own commercial
reasons. But this will shift some burden, create some costs, impose some
burdens in the form of employee screening. The screening will not be
focussed on nationality. That may be a factor for certain nationalities and
certain individuals. But certainly a number of cases on technology in the
United States have not involved foreigners. They have involved domestic
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citizens, one hundred percent true blue, who just got seduced by some other
reasons.
This will create problems, but we are prepared to take on some of those,
because they will address some of those security concerns. They will reaffirm the Canadian commitment to a common North American defense and
a common North American defense industrial base. With these changes, we
hope to resolve what has been a very prolonged negotiation, bedeviled by
much wrangling over details. It has led to my sitting with engineers who
were talking about things that I had no idea what they meant. The Canadian
exemption, which was about one page, will probably emerge, even in its
agreed form, at six or seven pages of U.S. regulatory language. As part of the
package, we have insisted the United States issue explanatory notes of some
kind, because, frankly, it is difficult to tell just what is being covered. But we
hope that there will be, at the end of this process, a re-affirmation of
cooperation in this field; that there will be joined efforts at reaching out to
the industries, both in Canada and the United States, in saying, this is the
regime. Both governments agree on it and maybe we can wrap up this
episode on a high note.
I would have hoped to have been standing before you today to be able to
announce that. I am not in a position to do that. Though perhaps within
months we will be in a position to say that another Canadian-U.S. dispute has
been resolved after protractive negotiations. A little good will and a lot of
high level attention, have helped to drive the process. So, I will turn it back
to Terry, but certainly I am prepared, after some of his remarks, to take on
some of the questions you might have.

